Home Health Care: An Annotated Bibliography (Bibliographies and Indexes in Gerontology)

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The entries in Part One annotate book-length or other evaluations declaring the failure, partial success, or considerable achievement of federal action that intended to make life better for older Americans. In addition to global appraisals, Part One offers entries dealing with key principles in the making of federal policy on aging. The entries that comprise Part Two provide a comprehensive sampling of the policies, programs, and issues of importance in the study of aging and older Americans. Among the issues related to federal public policy on aging that are covered are: income and retirement policy, health and long-term care, housing, services, consumer issues, discrimination, education, empowerment, family policy, intergenerational concerns, minorities, research, rural programs, training, and women.

It also unveiled the lack of economic development in Kurdish areas and exposed the discriminatory practices against the Kurds in education and recruitment to the police, military academies, and other civil services. Immediately after the announcement of the Union between Syria and Egypt, Kurdish leaders were arrested and Kurdish publications were outlawed. Following Syria's secession from the UAR in , political repression against the Kurds intensified and took on a legal dimension in its execution. This culminated in the promulgation of Decree 93 which called for a special census in the Kurdish area of Jezira and resulted in loss of Syrian citizenship by , Kurds.

After the accession of the Ba'th to power in , the oppression of the Kurds went even farther. An arabization plan was effected that took the form of creating an Arab Belt al-Hizam al-Arabi. This plan aimed to expropriate the Kurds from their lands and push them to emigrate from the border regions to other places in and outside Syria. The evacuated regions and villages were populated by Arabs and were renamed to give them an Arab identity.

Assad needed the Kurds for both external and internal reasons. First, he sought to please them, declaring die end of forced transfers from Jezira Then he used them to wipe out Arab opposition movements, particularly the Sunni radicals. Assad also used the Kurds to fight Arab wars for him; for example, several thousand Kurds served in the Syrian army and died during the Lebanese civil war. As of the s, the Kurds were allowed to perform and sell tapes of their native songs and speak Kurdish in the streets. On the other hand, however, more than , Kurds continue to be denied citizenship.

Teaching in Kurdish language is still prohibited. The Kurds may celebrate Newruz New Year's Day , however, only in the countryside—away from public attention. Moreover, Kurds are still not allowed to form their own political parties. The success of the Kurds in electing fifteen Kurdish candidates to the Syrian Parliament in was a necessity rather than a sincere desire to lift the restrictions on the Kurds.

The future of the Kurds in Syria is no less bleak than those of their compatriots elsewhere. Like the Kurds in Israel and Lebanon, the Soviet Kurds moved in there in waves with the first apparently taking place in the 1st century BC. Among these tribes were the Shaddadis who ruled a large part of the area between and AD. See also Mustafa Nazdar, pseud. The fourth phase of Kurdish migration into the Caucasus took place the 19th century.

The wars between Russia and Turkey , , , and the Kurdish revolts throughout the century swelled the number of Yezidi Kurdish population with a flood of refugees seeking safety in the region. A final wave took place at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century when tens of thousands of Kurds moved from the Ottoman empire into Armenia and Georgia fleeing persecution. Soon after the creation of the Soviet state, the two Kurdish-dominated districts of Jewanshir with its capital Kelbajar and eastern Zangazur with its capital Lachin both in Azerbaijan were joined and officially designated in as "Kurdistan.

However, the period of Kurdish autonomy was very brief. In , "Red Kurdistan" was no longer an entity and Kurds ceased to be reported in Azeri population censuses. Moreover, beginning in the s, the Kurds, like many other Caucasian nationalities, began to face a series of repressive measures implemented by Stalin. The men were deported to secret places and the women and children were deported shortly afterwards to a different place. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan since over NagornoKarabakh resulted in the complete destruction of the Kurdish areas of "Red Kurdistan" and the deportation of more than , Kurds from their lands let alone the Muslim Kurds deported from Armenia.

Socio-economically speaking, the Kurds of the former Soviet Union can be divided into two main groups: advantaged and disadvantaged. The former mostly located in Armenia and Georgia mainly Yezidi Kurds while the latter in Azerbaijan and other republics mainly Muslim Kurds. For example, in Armenia, the Kurds were very well treated and given both encouragement and state funds to develop their culture and improve the socioeconomic conditions of their communities. Kurds there had their own network of schools, an institute of Kurdish studies at the Academy of Sciences at Yerevan, and a modest national press which includes a bi-weekly Kurdish newspaper Reiya Taze The New Course , published since in Yerevan with a circulation of 2,, copies.

Kurds studying in Moscow and Leningrad's universities were also a major source for the development of the socio-economic conditions of the local Kurds. All this resulted in the Kurds' preservation of their national identity and cultural heritage as well as in their social and economic prosperity.

Had the situation of the Kurds in Azerbaijan and other republics been the same as it was in Armenia and Georgia, it would have been easier to talk about a real use of the Soviet Kurds as agents or propagandists of Kurdish nationalism: Kurds in Armenia were very few and in Azerbaijan were and still are repressed. Once the Soviet Union was disintegrated, Armenians and Azerbaijanis almost instantly fell upon the Kurds with vengeance, stripping them of all those privileges. The Kurds in Europe51 Kurds have been migrating to Western Europe for over a century; however, this migration gained more intensity in the last four centuries.

In the s and s Kurds from Turkey were migrating primarily for economic reasons whereas those from Iraq and Syria were migrating particularly for political reasons. Kurds from Iraq and Syria were either fleeing persecution by their respective governments or leaving for Europe at the request of Mulla Mustafa Barzani for educational purposes and for disseminating news about the Kurdish national movement.

Most Kurds who migrated from Turkey knew no language other than Turkish and were reluctant to be involved in politics. The coup in Turkey 50See T. Arsitova, "Kurds," in Encyclopedia of World Cultures, vol. Friedrich and N. Diamond Boston, Mass: G. This coup led to a great influx of politicized, mostly young Kurds as asylum seekers. Their presence, and the news about the guerrilla war in Turkey that erupted in , worked as a catalyst of the Kurds' ethnic self-awareness. With their growing self-awareness, many Kurds started to discover that they were not Turks but Kurds.

As a result, while in the early s estimates were made of approximately , Kurds in Europe, by the late s estimates reached close to 2 million Kurds, the result of "rediscovery" rather than increased immigration. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has acquired central importance for the Kurdish movement in Turkey, the same way as the Kurdish diaspora in Lebanon had in the s and early s for the Kurdish national movement in Iraq and Syria and in the s and early s for the Kurdish movement in Turkey. As in Kurdistan and other parts of the world, Kurdish young men residing in Europe were and still are recruited either for fighting or as organizers, diplomats, and technicians of various sorts.

In addition, the PKK and its support organizations continue to publish a wide range of journals and magazines in Kurdish, Turkish, and the major European languages through which it voices its struggle against Turkey. Perhaps even more important in the long run than the political mobilization in the Kurdish diaspora are the cultural activities by Kurdish intellectuals in Europe which will also have a long-term political impact. Not only Kurmanji became a widely used language in Kurds' writings, but also Kurdish journals and books gradually increased in number and Kurdish cultural institutions were founded almost everywhere in Europe, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

According to van Bruinessen: "The Kurdish institutes, Kurdish print media and Kurdish language courses that operate in western Europe, largely impervious to control by the Turkish state, have provided the Kurdish movement with instruments of nation building comparable to those traditionally employed by states. In , a powerful instrument was added to this arsenal, the satellite television station MED-TV, which broadcast to the Middle East and Europe, among other regions.

All of these developments in the Kurdish movement led Bruinessen to conclude: "However one defines what a nation is, by practically every definition the Kurds have over the past two decades become more of one, and have dissociated themselves somewhat from the Iraqi and Turkish "state-nations'. Even the relatively more recent Kurdish communities in Europe and the United States gained more research attention than the older Kurdish community in Lebanon. The reason for this negligence is two fold: First, despite their relatively long stay in Lebanon, the Kurds have failed to establish themselves powerfully, primarily because of the social and political status that was imposed on them by the Lebanese confessional politics.

The Kurds in Lebanon never gained public or official attention except at times when Kurdish youngsters were needed to fight a certain battle for a certain party, or at times when Kurdish votes were needed by a local za 'im leader to be successful in a certain election. Furthermore, almost never were the social and political problems of the Muslim, non-Arab Kurds of prime concern to any of the Lebanese successive governments or leaders. Second, at a time when no body was interested in studying the Kurdish community in Lebanon, the Kurds, on die other hand, have failed to produce the necessary cadre or intelligentsia that would be able to do so.

Because virtually nothing is published on the Kurds in Lebanon, I will discuss the topic in some detail see next chapter. It is true that all Kurds realize diat they belong to a common entity and all have occasionally taken part in Kurdish nationalist movements, yet, there has never been a united Kurdish movement. Division by personal, tribal, regional, and sect has been the rule radier than the exception. The geopolitical situation moreover has made the Kurds vulnerable to manipulation by outside powers.

Throughout dieir revolts, Kurdish leaders have always hoped to achieve national rights through foreign support. However, they seldom realized that they were fighting others' wars. The Kurds' limited alternatives and perhaps more importantly the foreign powers' carelessness about their fate, encourage outside powers to exploit the Kurds and leave them to death. Kurdish national identity has developed considerably in the last few years and will never disappear despite military pressure.

Surrounded from all sides by enemies, however, Kurdish national rights will continue to be denied for a long time to come. This is particularly true given the carelessness of the United States, Russia, the European countries, and the United Nations about the violation of Kurdish human, civil, and national rights by the countries occupying Kurdistan and mistreating its people. The second major wave took place in the period between World War II and the early s.

A large portion of these new immigrants arrived from Turkey, however, the vast majority came from Syria fleeing the socioeconomic, cultural, and political repression that began there in see below. The relative improvement in the living conditions of the Kurds in Lebanon, and the proximity of the country to Kurdistan, played an important role in encouraging these new immigrants to choose Lebanon as their new home or temporary place of residence.

All Kurds in Lebanon are Sunni Muslims. However, they are divided into many tribal or communal groups with each linked to the village or region from which it came. These communal groups are named after their villages of 1Kurdish presence in Lebanon goes as far back as the twelfth century A. Over the next few centuries, several other Kurdish families or tribes were sent to Lebanon by various powers e. These Kurdish groups settled in and ruled many areas of Lebanon for long periods of time.

Detached from their homeland for so many years, these Kurdish families became fully integrated into Lebanon's social and political structure and were completely arabized by the end of the 19th century. Linguistically, the Kurds in Lebanon are divided into two main groups: those who speak the North Kurmanji also called Bahdinani dialect and those who speak the Mardin dialect, a mix of Arabic, Kurdish, Syriac, and Turkish widi die dominant tongues Arabic and Kurmanji.

Kurmanji speakers have greater ease in understanding Mardinli speakers than vice versa. Today, there are 20 different religious and ethnic groups who live in Lebanon. However, there is no official census or an accurate number of the Kurds. There are two main reasons for this: first, because no official census has taken place in Lebanon since and, second, because Kurds are still denied their ethnic distinction from other Lebanese groups. Unlike the Armenians, who are ethnically and religiously recognized as a distinct group, Kurds in Lebanon are considered as Sunni Muslims with no special status accorded to their ethnicity.

Estimates about the number of Kurds prior to varied between 60, and 90, persons. Others, especially those who came from Syria, settled in the impoverished area of al-Karantina-al-Maslakh. The Kurds' residential compounds primarily reflected their tribal organizations, each according to its lineage. Like their kinsmen elsewhere, many Lebanese Kurds have experienced various forms of forced resettlement; in many cases, more than once. For example, in early , most of the Kurds who survived the Christian Maronite massacres in al-Karantina-al-Maslakh moved to West Beirut, Khaldeh, al-Jnah, and other areas of the 'Misery Belt' where new low-income residential areas were being built.

Then in the s, Lebanon lost approximately one-fourth of its Kurdish population when whole families began to emigrate to Europe as a consequence of: 1 the Israeli invasion; 2 harassment by Christian-dominated government forces in ; and 3 internal conflicts with the Lebanese Shi'ites see below. Families living in houses that were evacuated by the Christians and later on occupied by Kurds and odier Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian groups during the war, were also forced to move out.

Only a few of these families were financially compensated. Their poverty, lack of property and occupational skills, high illiteracy rate, feeling of insecurity and alienation, and their ill-treatment by various Lebanese groups were all found significantly related to the Kurds' status as noncitizens. At that time, Christians probably outnumbered Muslims, and that predominance increased with the influx of thousands of Armenian refugees who escaped Turkish genocide during World War I and its aftermath.

In , France theoretically gave Lebanese citizenship to all erstwhile Ottoman citizens living in Lebanon. Thus, these Armenian refugees further reinforced Christian hegemony in Lebanon. A census showed that Christians outnumbered Muslims by a ratio of The knowledge that Muslims tended to have high birthrates prompted Christian Maronites to make every effort possible to prevent any new census taken and to deny citizenship to Muslim immigrants in order to maintain their political predominance in the country.

Until it remained possible to acquire Lebanese citizenship provided the applicant had resided in Lebanon continuously for at least five years, or had married a Lebanese wife and resided in the country for one year after their marriage Decree. However, many Kurds failed to recognize the 5 Ibid, pp. Study participants were drawn from a list of members of the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association. Snowballing was employed to include as many non-Kurmanji speakers as possible. Travel, for example, which usually necessitates the holding of citizenship ID cards was—until —possible without these cards; people could have done so then by a certificate issued by the French authorities.

According to a Kurdish local, had that not been the case, more Kurds would have applied for citizenship, especially because many of them traveled back and forth to Syria and Turkey. It was mainly the introduction of war-time rationing in that made Kurds recognize the value of citizenship. During World War II, the majority of the Kurds were deprived from food ration cards because they did not have Lebanese citizenship.

Although this incident made many Kurds rush into applying for citizenship, the appreciation of it, however, began too late. Legislation in made Lebanese naturalization theoretically impossible, particularly for the Kurds, and later in the decade for the Palestinian Muslim refugees Palestinian Christian refugees were granted citizenship. For example, on February 1, , 17 Kurdish families agreed in a court in the Christian town of Junieh to change their religious status from Sunni Muslims to Maronite Christians in return for naturalization.

They kept the citizenship. Later in the year, a group of Chaldean Christians were granted citizenship. This incident created another national crisis. In order to resolve the conflict, the Christian Maronites agreed to naturalize an equal number of Kurds. Following is an example of such appeals.

In a statement to the members of the Lebanese Parliament on August 1, , Sa'ib Salam, a Sunni Muslim leader, addressed the Parliament stating: 'There are people born in this country like you, and they have legitimate rights as you and I do; however, they are deprived of exercising ordinary citizens' rights There are some of them who cannot legally marry, have children, or even die Most Kurds applied. However, action on all applications was immediately frozen. An article in the Christian daily newspaper, an-Nahar, reported that the naturalization process was canceled because some of the [Christian] officials objected to it for fear of the long-term political consequences of such an action.

The report added that these officials 7 Despite the various obstacles created by the Christian Maronites, some Kurdish families were still able to get naturalized, usually through wasta, the influence they could bring to bear through money or contacts. For example, in , when Sami al-Sulh was Prime Minister, a number of Kurdish families were granted Lebanese citizenship on the basis of the Decree in return for electoral votes.

Junblat granted the Kurds 'non-specified citizenship' which allowed their children to acquire Lebanese citizenship by judicial decrees in accordance with the law. The Article on which the judicial decree was based stated that: "everyone born on Lebanese territory to parents of non-specified citizenship is considered a Lebanese. But due to Christian opposition, the granting of non-specified citizenship was soon abandoned and was replaced with 'quid al-dars' 'Under Consideration' ID cards.

Despite the fact that the issue of naturalizing the Kurds and other stateless minorities was raised in Parliament in more than a dozen of cabinets founded between and the early s, all efforts ended in failure due to the objection of the Christian Maronites.

The Under Consideration ID card was granted for a period of either one or three years after which it could be regularly renewed. The card was valid for all members of the immediate family.

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To obtain the card, fingerprints and official applications were required in addition to application fees. It is important to note here that most noncitizen Kurds suffered from the complicated transactions when renewing their ID cards. These transactions not only cost them application fees but also entailed costs resulting from brokerage. Furthermore, Kurds residing in European countries and elsewhere had grave problems when officials at Lebanese embasl0 an-Nahar [Beirut], September 14, Each cabinet would focus on the humanitarian aspect of the problem and the civil rights of the people who had been in the country for decades.

For instance, after his cabinet was formed in November , the Sunni Prime Minister Rashid al-Sulh insisted that the formal government statement include an article committed to resolving the issue of minority naturalization before the situation becomes too grave. In the midst of his argument against the proposition, George Saadeh, the Phalangist minister then, drew attention to the political ramifications of naturalizing the Kurds by stating: "We, the Phalangists, have worked hard in the past to give the Armenians Lebanese nationality and this was accomplished.

But what was the result? They have become the electoral balance in the districts they live in. So if the Prime Minister wants his electoral fate to be determined by the Kurds, we are with him. Kurds then incurred financial loss as a result of having to travel to Beirut with their families in order to complete the transactions.

This is not to mention those Kurds whose applications were turned down. These burdens on the Kurds did not come to an end until June 21, when, despite strong opposition by many Christians, the government of Rafiq alHariri issued a citizenship decree, whereby those who had no citizenship were invited to file applications. Unfortunately, many Kurds could either not afford the cost of the application, were abroad and thus unable to travel and file for themselves, or simply did not believe in it.

As a result, only 18, Kurds benefited from the decree. The processing took about two years.

After , there were attempts to issue another decree, particularly for those who missed the first opportunity. Over the last five years , the issuing of the second decree has been repeatedly postponed primarily because not enough Christian applicants were available. The issue is still pending. To best describe this type of discrimination, it might suffice to give a picture of the social class that the vast majority of Kurds belong to, namely, the lower class. In general, the lower class includes working people who possess neither office nor wealth, and little or no education.

They include taxi drivers, vegetable peddlers, barbers, sharecroppers, unskilled day laborers, servants, office boys, craftsman or tradesman who worked as employees or apprentices. Many of them form a sub-proletariat who are employed in menial jobs in construction, road building and small industries, for the most part with no social or medical insurance, or trade-union rights. Additionally, many members of the lower class, especially those who had been denied citizenship, are severely vulnerable to discriminatory treatment by others and treated unjustly and perceived as aliens.

Kurds, in particular, face greater adversity than most other members of the lower class such as the Shi'is, Syrians, and Arab noncitizens. The very fact that Kurds are not Arabs denies many of them employment, humanitarian support, and equal treatment in government offices, even if the Kurdish person is Lebanese in citizenship. Translated from German by John Richardson. KURDS IN LEBANON 33 Assuming that in Lebanon education both reinforces the position of many traditionally high status groups and provides others with an important channel for upward mobility,14 the fact that lower class people are relatively overwhelmed by the pressure to provide their families with adequate resources for survival, they have neither the money nor the time to send their working-age children to schools.

As a result, they become the least literate class in Lebanon and the easiest to be exploited and manipulated by others. According to Khuri, mobility from the lower to higher class not only requires wealth but also social and psychological mobility which means that the family has to transform itself from an extended family sub-culture—a characteristic of lower class communities—to new forms of family ties and duties often represented in nuclear types of families, and from social and economic dependence to social and economic independence. In the study that I undertook in , it was found that 85 percent of the Kurds live either within the poverty line or below it.

Their educational attainment is also extremely deficient. Almost 60 percent of the Kurds are virtually illiterate while 97 percent of their parents are in the same category. Most Kurds have large families, exceeding six children in about 44 percent of the cases. Kurds also overwhelmingly lack property; most of them are eidier renters or occupants of houses that were evacuated by the Christians during the civil war these houses are now given back to their original owners. The vast majority of the respondents maintained that the Lebanese people perceive the Kurds as aliens or inferior to them.

More than three quarters of the respondents indicated that the Lebanese government mistreat the Kurds in comparison to other minorities, and almost 60 percent revealed that the political structure in Lebanon does not allow ambitious Kurds to acquire important positions in the government. Now that a larger proportion of Kurds have become citizens, it remains to be seen how far and quick they will be able to change their current socioeconomic status and integrate into Lebanese society. As a result, they were forced to: 1 be part of a clientalist system that was generally working at their expense, and 2 to join forces against those who imposed on them their underprivileged status or threatened their very own existence.

Having said this, it is important to understand how this clientalist system in Lebanon specifically affected and still affects the Kurdish community. It is 14Paul D. Van Nieuwenhuijze Leiden: E. Brill, I5 Ibid, p. The Kurds in the Lebanese Clientalist System Throughout most of its history, Lebanon has essentially been characterized by the division of its population into competing families and religious confessions politically organized in what is known as patron-client relationships.

In exchange for their support of a za'im, usually in the form of votes or more active forms of political participation, the followers expect to receive assistance or favors in securing employment, government benefits, and mediation with government officials or other prominent persons.

Second, were the poorer and politically less important voters, who made up the majority of the za'im support base. Such people generally had simple requests which could be dealt with by the assistants of the za'im. The third category of clients comprised two groups of people: those who voted in another constituency and the disenfranchised Kurds and Palestinian refugees who had not been naturalized, a problem that meant they had nothing to offer the za'im and, as a result, were largely excluded from clientalist networks. This was because the disunited Kurds have always supported more than one political figure or bloc.

As a result, the Kurds denied themselves the concentrated power that could be efficiently used to exert pressure on local za'ims for benefits. There is little reason to suggest that this situation has changed today in comparison to the period between the mids and mids. The and parliamentary elections showed that the Kurds became better organized than 16According to Powell, three basic factors lie at the core of the patron-client relationship: first, the patron-client tie develops between two parties unequal in status, wealth and influence; so, in other words, it is a lopsided friendship.

Second, the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services. Third, the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties or, in other words, proximity. Finkle and Richard W. The Kurds are still divided among themselves and continue to be manipulated for their electoral power with little or nothing in return.

Even their several attempts at running for parliamentary elections ended in failure. The only Kurdish candidate in the elections received only 5, votes; that is, less by 10, votes that would have qualified the person for membership in the Parliament. The' electoral power of the Kurds is steadily growing; however, lacking resources and leadership, this power will continue to be exploited.

The next Lebanese parliamentary elections are scheduled for August and September The inhabitants of this latter area, mainly Kurds and Palestinians, were either shot if male or raped and driven out if female , and their hovels leveled. Only a few managed to escape. Describing the massacres of al-Karantina-al-Maslakh, Johnson wrote: The press accounts, films and photographs of the subsequent massacre were horrifying. The hovels were looted for whatever small items of value they contained, bodies of men and women were piled in the streets, and at least one terrified slum dweller shot his daughters rather than see them raped.

At the end of it all, the shacks of alKarantina were bulldozed, burying the dead to create a level empty space. The Kurds sought common cause with these progressive and Palestinian parties particularly because they thought that upon victory these forces would deliver them from per- 19The first time a Kurd nominated himself or herself to the Lebanese parliamentary elections was in , when Jamil Mihhu see section on Political Parties unsuccessfully participated as a candidate for the 2nd district in Beirut.

In the early years of the war, Kurdish participation in the war focused primarily on fighting the Christian militias in East Beirut. Thus, following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in , Kurds residing in Khaldeh and the areas surrounding West Beirut became subject to expulsions and detention by both the Israeli forces and their Lebanese Christian allies. Most Kurds who managed to escape before Israeli arrival moved to the Beirut and the Biqa' area. Consequently, tens of thousands of Kurds and others were forced to emigrate to Europe. Barely a year later, Druze, Shi'i, and Sunni militia forces, backed by Syria, ousted Israel's Maronite surrogates from predominantly Muslim areas.

In late , Amal, the main Shi'i militia then, began to exert its power to achieve ascendancy in South and West Beirut on behalf of Syria. Although its main focus was the suppression of the Palestinian camps' population in a series of nightmare sieges, Amal also fought the Sunni militias and had them rapidly eliminated.

Unhappy about the idea of Shi'i control of the Sunni-dominant West Beirut, both the Druzes and the Kurds joined forces to resist Amal's encroachments into vital areas of West Beirut. Kurdish militiamen were strong enough in their areas of concentration that they kept the Shi'is at bay in every battle they participated in. Fighting lasted until when an agreement between Syria and the warring factions was reached to withdraw all militias from Beirut and handover public order and security to Syrian forces.

However, the Shi'i forces remained in Beirut. They were still needed to maintain control over the areas around Palestinian camps. This left the Kurds vulnerable to Syrian surveillance and harassment as well as to Shi'i vengeance. Hundreds of Kurds, primarily those who were members in PSP, Palestinian organizations, and antiSyrian Kurdish organizations, were either killed or jailed by the Syrians and Shi'is.

Thousands others either fled the country to Europe, or moved out to the Biqa' region and the Druze mountains. The consequences of the Kurds' involvement in the war not only cost them lives and resulted in their displacement, but it further exposed the extent of prejudice they face in Lebanon. For instance, at the time when the Sunnis were fighting the Christians in the mids, it was reported that the Kurds were asked to volunteer their services as auxiliaries to the Sunni Murabitun militia of Beirut.

These services were willingly given. Yet, when it came to sharing out 21Hanf, p. It is argued that Kurdish identification with the Druzes had to do with Junblat family's Kurdish origin. But then, "for the Murabitun, the Kurds are just Kurds. They lived beyond Lebanese society and were beset by a crippling sense of indignation, injustice, and impotent bitterness against a system which had denied them legitimate human rights as citizens.

Hoping to change their situation, they mistakenly entered the civil war which further divided and impoverished them. Until today, the Kurds in Lebanon still feel relatively friendless. They have found few in Lebanon willing to fight their corner, or represent their interests. Based on the findings of my study, the Kurds have suffered from each and every major sectarian group in the country. The Christian Maronites denied them citizenship on the basis that such action will tilt the sectarian balance of the country towards die Muslims.

The Sunnis, influenced by several rival Arab ideologies e. For the Shi'ites, the Kurds were nothing but Sunni combatants or Druzes' allies. For the Druzes, the Kurds were good fighters. The Druzes, as well as the Sunnis wanted and used the Kurds to fight their wars, but when die Kurds were no longer needed they were ignored and disregarded. As far as local leaders are concerned, the study found that, with a few exceptions, Kurds mistrust all Lebanese political elites, consider them as unhelpful, and accuse them of being opportunists.

Only after the events that took place in and after did the Kurds start to think about such activities. First, following the civil war in Lebanon, the country witnessed a tremendous ruralurban migration the extent of which was that during the s alone nearly onefifth of Lebanon's rural population migrated to urban areas, mostly to Beirut and its suburbs.

Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, London: Routledge, , p. Consequently, the Kurds suffered severe economic losses and therefore started voicing their concerns over the citizenship issue. Also in , the union between Syria and Egypt was announced, apolitical act that had significant negative consequences on the social, economic, and political conditions of the Kurds in Syria.

The end result was ultimately felt in Lebanon. The union initiated the first oppressive measures against the Kurds in Syria. Aging and human sexuality resource guide. This Web site contains empirical evidence on aging and sexuality, summary chapters, case presentations, and resources to use for education in teaching settings or with clients.

It includes listings of journal articles, books, films and videos, health information, and professional organizations. Older adults and insomnia resource guide. This Web site includes research-based information on insomnia among older adults. It includes listings of journal articles, books, health information, and professional organizations. Depression and suicide in o lder adults. This Web site provides research-based information about causes of and treatments for depression among older adults and information about suicide in this age group.

It includes research-based listings of journal articles, books and book chapters, reports, and resources for older adults and their families. Psychotherapy and older adults.

Home Health Care: An Annotated Bibliography (Bibliographies and Indexes in Gerontology)

This Web site provides information on assessment of psychological disorders among older adults and appropriate treatments. Psychological services for long term care resource guide. This Web site addresses professional practice with older adults living in nursing homes and other long term care settings. It includes listings of journal articles, books and book chapters, and resources for older adults and their families. Cruikshank, M. Learning to be old: Gender, culture, and aging.

Examines the social construction of aging from a feminist viewpoint.

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It features new research and analysis, expanded sections on GLBT aging and critical gerontology, and an updated chapter on feminist gerontology. The biology of ageing: A primer. Stuart-Hamilton Ed. This chapter provides an introduction to key biological concepts of aging. Evolutionary models and sources of variation in aging are discussed. Dixon, R. Yes, memory declines with aging—but when, how, and why? Ohta Eds. This chapter integrates information on new methods and approaches to research on memory and aging. Assuming that declarative memory declines with age, the authors investigate when, how, and why memory changes with aging.

The authors discuss their own longitudinal study and other current research findings. Dotterer, A. Support to aging parents and grown children in Black and White families. The Gerontologist, 51 4 , This study investigated racial differences in support to family generations. Middle-aged adults rated social support they provided to aging parents and to grown children.

Results indicated that Black middle-aged adults provided more support to parents than White middle-aged adults, whereas White middle-aged adults provided more support to grown children than Black middle-aged adults. Ewen, H. Professional and personal development in contemporary gerontology doctoral education. Educational Gerontology, 38 1 , Ferrer, E. Methodological and analytical issues in the psychology of aging.

This chapter reviews key methodological and analytical issues and challenges in aging research, including those involved in the use of longitudinal designs. Fiske, S. Managing ambivalent prejudices: Smart-but-cold and warm-but-dumb stereotypes.

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Discusses the ambivalent forms of prejudice produced by crossing the competence and warmth dimensions, including those which characterize attitudes toward older individuals warm but incompetent. Haber, D.

  1. Electronic States and Optical Transitions in Semiconductor Heterostructures (Graduate Texts in Contemporary Physics).
  2. Patient-Centered Care Bibliography?
  3. Society for the Teaching of Psychology - Aging;
  4. The Tectonics of China: Data, Maps and Evolution;
  5. Unscientific America: How Scientific Illiteracy Threatens our Future.
  6. Gay aging. This article provides an overview of research on issues of aging in the LGBT population. Helmes, E. Attitudes toward older workers among undergraduates: Does status make a difference? Educational Gerontology , 38 6 , This study considered the possibility of subtypes in perceptions of older adults and evaluated whether attitudes among undergraduates towards older professionals were more positive than those toward older adults in general. The results suggested negative attitudes among undergraduates toward older workers and adults in general may not hold when applied to those with professional status.

    Hill, R. A positive aging framework for guiding geropsychology interventions. Behavior Therapy, 42 1 , This article describes and promotes an approach to well-being in older adults which involves the use of positive aging strategies in combination with behavioral intervention. Icon Group International. Lapierre, S. Quinnett, P.

    The Image of Older Adults in the Media

    A systematic review of elderly suicide prevention programs. In response to the paucity of research on suicide prevention in old age, the authors conducted a systematic review of the literature on interventions targeting suicidal elderly persons and identified successful strategies. Johnson, M. The Cambridge handbook of age and ageing.

    Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Karel, M. Aging and mental health in the decade ahead: What psychologists need to know. American Psychologist, 67 3 , This article discusses the increasing need for geropsychology competencies among mental health professionals, as they provide primary care, dementia and family caregiving services, decision-making-capacity evaluation, and end-of-life care. The authors conclude that aging should be integrated into psychology education across levels of training. Kryspin-Exner, I.

    Bestselling Series

    Geropsychology: The gender gap in human aging — a mini review. Gerontology, 57 6 , Reviews research on the physiological and psychological differences between aging men and women, including gender discrepancies in psychopathology. Lassonde, K. Using the contradiction paradigm to assess ageism. Journal of Aging Studies, 26 2 , This article describes the use of the contradiction paradigm, an implicit measure, to assess age-related stereotypes in passages describing older adults.

    LeBlanc, L. Behavioral gerontology. Fisher, C.

    Roane Eds. Reviews the literature on the use of behavior analysis and therapy to increase the well-being of older adults. The authors suggest that advantages of this approach include avoidance of ageism, focus on environmental factors that promote or suppress behavior, belief in the potential reversibility of decline, and cost-effectiveness and consistency in treatment approach. Basic research, clinical application, and organizational application are addressed.

    Lin, X. Measures for assessing student attitudes toward older people. Educational Gerontology, 37 1 , Marin, M. Mexican American elderly: Self-reported anxiety and the mediating influence of family protective factors. The Family Journal, 19 1 , This study investigated the relationship between life satisfaction and protective factors that contribute to family resilience for Mexican American elderly who self-report anxiety. ODonoghue, M. Depression and ageing: Assessment and intervention. Ryan, P. Coughlan Eds. New York, NY: Routledge.

    Discusses the prevalence, manifestations, assessment, and treatment of depression in older adults. Palmore, E. The international handbook on aging. Abingdon, UK: Praeger. Leading experts in the field of aging discuss psychological issues such as depression among older adults and social issues such as how individuals and public policies will deal with the changing shape of the family. Qualls, S. Aging families and caregiving.

    This guide addresses the complex issues that arise in working with family caregivers including integration of families into long-term care mental health services and clinical services for families taking care of an older person. Includes clinical illustrations, guidance, and tips for practice. Schaie, K. Ageist language in psychological research. American Psychologist, 48 , 49— Sorrell, J. Meeting the mental health needs of the aging veteran population: A challenge for the 21st century. Sterns, H. Annual review of gerontology and geriatrics, Vol. Gerontological and geriatric education.